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Despite the maternal medicine crisis in the U.S., especially for Black women, 
legislatures are challenging constitutional abortion doctrine and forcing women to 
interact with a system that may cost them their lives. This Article proposes that 
because of abysmal maternal mortality rates and the arbitrary nature of most 
abortion restrictions, the right to choose an abortion is embedded in our Fourteenth 
Amendment right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life by the State. This Article is a 
call to abortion advocates to begin submitting state maternal mortality data when 
challenging abortion restrictions. The call for attention to life was central to the 
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The Scales of Reproductive Justice: Casey’s Failure to Re-




We’re talking about a woman who was far better than I ever 
deserved and made me far better than I ever thought I could 
be. We’re talking about a woman that raced cars, who ran 
marathons, who had her pilot’s license—talking about a wom-
an who spoke four languages fluently and who taught me so 
much . . . . We walked into Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 
with Kira on April 12th of 2016 with a woman who was not 
just in good health, she was in exceptional health. . . . 8 
O’clock comes, I’m begging, I’m pleading, my family is advo-
cating for my wife. . . . At which point the staff at Cedars-
Sinai Medical Center tells me, “your wife is not a priority 
right now.” It was not until after midnight that they finally 
took Kira back to the O.R. . . . That was the last time I saw 
my wife alive. . . . Kira deserved better. My sons deserved 
better. Women all over this country deserve better. . . .
There’s no statistic that can quantify what it’s like to tell an 
18-month old that his mother’s never coming home.
Charles Johnson, 
advocating on behalf of his late wife, 
Kira Johnson.1
The United States has the worst maternal mortality rate among 
high-income nations—and it is only getting worse.2 The numbers are 
∗ Juris Doctor candidate, 2021, University of Connecticut School of Law. Many 
thanks to my faculty advisor, Professor Jamelia Morgan, who supported me throughout 
the entire writing process. Thank you to my undergraduate professors at Spelman College 
who taught me to value everyday feminism just as much as academic feminism. Finally, 
thank you to my mother, Lori, who taught me to question everything, to fight for what 
matters, and to create means where there are none.
1. 4KIRA4MOMS, Charles Johnson Shares the Tragic Story of His Wife Kira’s Death 
Hours After Giving Birth., YOUTUBE (June 7, 2018), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=05uBCBfrY4g [https://perma.cc/7XK9-A2TY].
2. Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, U.S. Has the Worst Rate of Maternal Deaths in the 
Developed World, NPR & PROPUBLICA (May 12, 2017, 10:28 AM), https://www.npr.org
/2017/05/12/528098789/u-s-has-the-worst-rate-of-maternal-deaths-in-the-developed-
world [https://perma.cc/XY9T-TGXM] (“More American women are dying of preg-
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even more troubling for Black women in the United States, with rates 
three to four times higher than that of white women, “regardless of edu-
cation, income, or any other socio-economic factors.”3 Abortion re-
strictions that do not confer medical benefits sufficient to outweigh ob-
stacles imposed4 force women to give birth in the racially disparate state 
of maternal medicine—which could cost them their lives. The current 
undue burden framework5 is not protecting the interests in the life of 
Black women6 in the United States when it fails to consider the disparate 
risk of maternal mortality for Black mothers—although doctrine requires 
it. Both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey discuss the insufficiency of states’ interests to outweigh the wom-
an’s life,7 yet the standard that emerged from those cases is not being used 
to assess the woman’s interest in life, only the constitutionally protected 
personal liberty to choose. Because maternal mortality data so strongly 
intersects with the interest in protecting a woman’s life, courts should al-
low abortion advocates to incorporate maternal mortality data into the 
body of evidence in abortion cases.
Part I of this Note discusses the crisis facing Black women in mater-
nal medicine. Most relevantly, the racial disparities manifest in maternal 
mortality rates, though Part I also examines the racial implications of dis-
crepancies in epidural administration and how that informs this issue. Part 
II explains why, in consideration of the increased dangers facing pregnant 
Black women, the undue burden standard set forth by Casey,8 modified 
by Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,9 does not go far enough to ad-
dress the compelling interest “at the core of the constitutional liberty identified 
nancy-related complications than any other developed country. Only in the U.S. has the 
rate of women who die been rising.”).
3. Suzanne Delbanco, Maclaine Lehan, Thi Montalvo & Jeffrey Levin-Scherz, The 
Rising U.S. Maternal Mortality Rate Demands Action from Employers, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 
28, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/06/the-rising-u-s-maternal-mortality-rate-demands-
action-from-employers [https://perma.cc/3RY3-8TBT]; see also Pregnancy-Related Deaths,
CDC (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth
/pregnancy-relatedmortality.htm [https://perma.cc/D3NL-RUMK].
4. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (“The 
rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law impos-
es on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.”).
5. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 
(1992).
6. For consistency with case law, this Note will use the term, “woman,” with this 
acknowledgement that transgender men and gender nonconforming people must also be 
included in the discourse on reproductive justice. 
7. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
8. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
9. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
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in [Roe].”10 Part III asserts that the discriminatory state of maternal medi-
cine and abortion restrictions, viewed in conjunction, violate a woman’s 
fundamental right to choose her own life. Part III also proposes a sup-
plementary analysis to assess statutes that are potentially unconstitutional.
I.  The Maternal Medicine Crisis
Racial bias in healthcare is not unique to maternal medicine.11 “Ex-
tant research has shown that relative to white patients, black patients are 
less likely to be given pain medications and, if given pain medications, 
they receive lower quantities.”12 A study conducted by four professors at 
the University of Virginia revealed that half of the medical students and 
residents surveyed endorsed false beliefs about biological differences be-
tween Black and white patients.13 Further, the participants that held those 
false beliefs made less accurate treatment recommendations.14 The study 
demonstrated “that beliefs about biological differences between blacks 
and whites—beliefs dating back to slavery—are associated with . . . inad-
equate treatment recommendations for black patients’ pain”15 and made it 
evident that science and medicine are not immune from American rac-
ism.16 Black patients receive less preventative care and lower-quality, less-
intensive hospital care.17
But even within the context of maternal medicine, the studies re-
garding maternal mortality are numerous, well-supported, and alarming. 
The United States maternal mortality rate more than doubled from 1991 
to 2014.18 Nearly sixty percent of pregnancy-related deaths are preventa-
10. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
11. See generally Kelly M. Hoffman, Sophie Trawalter, Jordan R. Axt & Norman Oli-
ver, Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs about 
Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCIS. 4296 (2016) (discussing the impact of racial bias on medical treatment).
12. Id. at 4296 (citation omitted). 
13. Id. at 4298-300. 
14. Id. at 4300. 
15. Id.
16. See David R. Williams & Toni D. Rucker, Understanding and Addressing Racial Dis-
parities in Health Care, 21 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 75, 76 (2000) (“Throughout 
the history of the United States, non-dominant racial groups have, either by law or cus-
tom, received inferior treatment in major societal institutions. Medical care is no excep-
tion.”).
17. Kevin Fiscella, Peter Franks, Marthe R. Gold & Carolyn M. Clancy, Inequality in 
Quality: Addressing Socioeconomic, Racial, and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care, 283 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 2579, 2580 (2000).
18. Delbanco et al., supra note 3.
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ble.19 In addition to the approximately 700 American women who die 
from pregnancy related complications each year, a staggering 65,000 
nearly die from those complications.20 Those numbers place the United 
States forty-sixth in the world in maternal morality measures.21 American 
women are fourteen times more likely to die during childbirth than dur-
ing an abortion.22
The statistics regarding maternal death in the United States are al-
ready disturbing, but the crisis worsens when narrowing in on race. The 
CDC’s recent numbers reflect 14.7 deaths per 100,000 live births for 
white women, yet 37.1 deaths per 100,000 live births for Black women.23
To illustrate the disparity: “[A] black woman is 22 percent more likely to 
die from heart disease than a white woman, 71 percent more likely to 
perish from cervical cancer, but 243 percent more likely to die from 
pregnancy- or childbirth-related causes.”24 In certain American cities, the 
disparity is even greater: between 2011 and 2015, Black mothers in New 
York City were eight times more likely to die than their white counter-
parts.25 The racial disparity in maternal medicine even persists beyond so-
cio-economic factors: Black, college-educated women are still more like-
ly to suffer severe, pregnancy related complications than white women 
19. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
MATERNAL MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE POSTPARTUM PERIOD IS A MISSED
OPPORTUNITY FOR ACTION 1 (2018) [hereinafter Racial Disparities]; Delbanco et al., supra
note 3.
20. Pregnancy-Related Deaths, supra note 3; YWCA, MATERNAL HEALTH AND WOMEN 
OF COLOR 1 (2017), https://www.ywca.org/wp-content/uploads/BRIEFING_PAPER_
MATERNAL_HEALTH_AND_WOMEN_OF_COLOR_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F67T-GDPG]; see also Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, The Last Per-
son You’d Expect to Die in Childbirth, NPR & PROPLUBLICA (May 12, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/12/527806002/focus-on-infants-during-childbirth-
leaves-u-s-moms-in-danger [https://perma.cc/69D8-L7NJ].
21. YWCA, supra note 20, at 1.
22. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced 
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 215 
(2012); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering 
Against Abortion Rights, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 64 (2019).
23. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., Maternal Mortality, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov
/nchs/maternal-mortality/index.htm [https://perma.cc/YUG8-ULSV] (last reviewed 
Nov. 20, 2019).
24. Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, Lost Mothers: Nothing Protects Black Women from 
Dying in Pregnancy and Childbirth, NPR & PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/nothing-protects-Black-women-from-dying-in-
pregnancy-and-childbirth [https://perma.cc/R3UK-7FZY].
25. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, PREGNANCY-ASSOCIATED 
MORTALITY: NEW YORK CITY, 2011-2015 5 (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets
/doh/downloads/pdf/ms/pregnancy-associated-mortality-report-2011-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZXM-NCPK].
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without a high school diploma.26 It would be shortsighted for constitu-
tional analyses regarding abortion restrictions to not begin considering 
the realities for Black women facing the current inadequacies of maternal 
care.
The international community has taken note of these failings. In 
2008, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination “validated charges that the U.S. has failed to actively combat 
racial discrimination in reproductive health care. . . . [and] called on the 
U.S. government to reduce high rates of maternal and infant mortali-
ty . . . .”27 A Black woman in the United States has worse odds of surviv-
ing childbirth than a woman in Uzbekistan—where a significant percent-
age of the population is impoverished—while white women in the 
United States have maternal mortality rates more comparable to New 
Zealand.28 In Arkansas, the state with the worst maternal mortality rec-
ord, the rate is even higher than that of the occupied Palestinian Gaza 
Strip and West Bank.29 In the developed infrastructure of the United 
States, the “common thread is that when black women expressed con-
cerns about their symptoms, clinicians were more delayed [in their re-
sponses] and seemed to believe them less.”30
Racial disparities in maternal medicine do not exclusively impact 
mortality rates–they are present throughout the birth experience. A study 
published by the American Society of Anesthesiologists found that Black 
and Hispanic women in labor are less likely to receive an epidural, even 
when adjusting for socioeconomic status, clinical risk factors, provider 
26. Martin & Montagne, supra note 23.
27. Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., U.N. Committee Finds U.S. is Falling Short 
in Tackling Racism in Reproductive Health Care (Mar. 7, 2008),
https://reproductiverights.org/press-room/un-committee-finds-us-is-falling-short-in-
tackling-racism-in-reproductive-health-care [https://perma.cc/Z3QL-DS73].
28. Amy Roeder, America is Failing Its Black Mothers, HARV. PUB. HEALTH (Winter 
2019); CIA, Country Comparison: Maternal Mortality Rate, in WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/353rank.html
[https://perma.cc/T69D-NEW7] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
29. See CDC, Maternal Mortality, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternal-
mortality/index.html [https://perma.cc/DX5G-NL8G] (last reviewed Aug. 13, 2020);
CIA, supra note 27; Amnesty Int’l, The Israeli Occupation, https://www.amnesty.org
/en/latest/campaigns/2019/01/chapter-1-background/ [https://perma.cc/8VU9-SK2B]
(last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
30. Roeder, supra note 27 (citing Dr. Neel Shah, an OBGYN at Beth Israel Deaconess 
Medical Center). Former Head of the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Dr. Michael 
Lu, also attributed poor outcomes for Black women to “prolonged exposure to the indig-
nities and dangers of discrimination,” a phenomenon known as “weathering.” Martin &
Montagne, supra note 23.
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effect, and more.31 Despite pain management being “an important 
domain of healthcare quality. . . . [f]ew studies have examined racial and 
ethnic differences in the treatment of labor pain.”32 This study found 
evidence that patients with private insurance receive epidural analgesia at 
higher rates than patients without insurance, but Black patients with 
private insurance receive the pain management drug at the same rate as 
white patients without insurance.33 This study’s conclusions suggest that 
medical professionals perceive Black women’s pain to be lesser or their 
pain tolerance to be greater. Due to such perceptions, Black women are 
systemically undertreated in maternal medicine,34 which assumedly, 
contributes to the higher rates of mortality for Black women. The care of 
Black women in all stages of maternal medicine warrants a closer look at 
the laws that conscript women into unwanted childbirth and force them 
to interact with this racist system.
The racial disparities that Black people face in medicine clearly have 
negative effects, but the outcomes for Black women in maternal medi-
cine are so troublesome to the interest in life that it implicates the Con-
stitution. In light of the grave inadequacies of maternal care, women have 
a heightened interest in avoiding the maternal medicine system through 
abortion care. Accessing abortion care is not free from racial inequity35—
which deepens the necessity to closely scrutinize any further restriction to 
abortion access.
This is not to say that a majority of women who die from pregnan-
cy related complications sought abortions prior or would have chosen to 
terminate their pregnancies had they known their fate. But as Casey
states, “[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom 
the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”36
The law, and this analysis, is not applicable to women who would not 
have sought an abortion. Rather, deceased women who would have 
31. Laurent G. Glance, Richard Wissler, Christopher Glantz, Turner M. Osler, Dana 
B. Mukamel & Andrew W. Dick, Racial Differences in the Use of Epidural Analgesia for La-
bor, 106 ANESTHESIOLOGY 19, 19 (2007).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23. 
34. See id. at 24. 
35. Nikita Mhatre, Abortion Restrictions Hurt Women of Color, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-impact/blog/general
/abortion-restrictions-hurt-women-of-color.html [https://perma.cc/P3GY-LNXP]
(“Due to factors such as structural racism and discrimination, women of color face ram-
pant income inequality and are more likely to be covered by Medicaid as a result. They 
are therefore disproportionately impacted by the Hyde Amendment, which bans federal 
funds for abortion care in Medicaid. . . . [A]nti-abortion organizations have targeted 
Black women and Latinas with false and harmful rhetoric . . . .”).
36. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
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sought abortions if not for arbitrarily restricted access were unconstitu-
tionally deprived of life, as explained in Part III.
II. The Shortcomings of the “Undue Burden” Standard
Following Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court shaped abortion doc-
trine through Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey and 
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt. The undue burden standard emerged 
as the prevailing measure of the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. 
However, that standard has not—and possibly cannot—account for how 
those burdens contribute to deprivations of life that Roe condemned.37
A.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In reaffirming Roe,38 the Court in Casey held that matters “involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time . . . are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,” and thus, women have the right “to choose to have an abortion 
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the 
State.”39 The Court proceeds to define an undue burden as “a state regu-
lation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”40 The 
goal of the undue burden standard is to reconcile the State’s interest in 
protecting a potential life with a woman’s constitutionally protected per-
sonal liberty.41 However, that standard, in its articulation and application, 
is incomplete according to the very framework from which it derives, as 
it does not account for how those interests must be reweighed in light of 
the egregious racial disparities in pregnancy related deaths.
According to the plurality in Casey, “Roe forbids a State to interfere 
with a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing 
her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health.”42 Casey also cites 
to Harris v. McRae,43 which articulates the focus on life even more defini-
tively: “[E]ven the compelling interest of the State in protecting potential 
life after fetal viability [is] insufficient to outweigh a woman’s decision to 
protect her life or health[;] it could be argued that the freedom of a woman 
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
38. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“The right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851, 846.
40. Id. at 877.
41. Id. at 876. 
42. Id. at 880 (referencing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164).
43. Id. at 875.
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to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons does in fact lie at 
the core of the constitutional liberty identified in Wade.”44 Additionally, the 
Court recently affirmed Hellerstedt’s focus on health benefits to the wom-
an.45 The United States Supreme Court has reiterated time and time 
again, that at the very core of abortion doctrine is a woman’s right to 
protect her life and the importance of her health,46 yet the reigning stand-
ard addresses neither without considering racially disparate maternal mor-
tality data. Without maternal mortality data, there is no way for courts to 
consider whether women in states with harsh abortion restrictions are dy-
ing from the pregnancies they intended to terminate.
Legislatures attempt to satisfy the requirement that State interests47
yield to the life and health of the mother by including provisions for 
medical emergencies.48 Medical emergency exceptions are insufficient, as 
a study published in the American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology found 
that a noteworthy number of low-risk pregnancies result in complica-
tions.49 For Black women in the United States, too often the only way to 
know if she needs an “abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death 
or . . . serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment” will be after 
she has already died.50
B.  Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt
The Court in Whole Women’s Health reframes the undue burden 
standard articulated in Casey by requiring that regulations placing a “sub-
44. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (emphasis added). In the paragraph 
immediately following, the Court departs from its declaration and held that it “does not 
follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the 
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.” Id.
45. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2126, (2020) (affirming Heller-
stedt). 
46. See, e.g., id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. The Court in Hellerstedt
demonstrated significant reliance on health benefits for women. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. at 
2300, 2310, 2318.
47. Ideally, State interest would genuinely be the life and the health of the mother, 
rather than a pretext for control over women’s bodies. 
48. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (2020) (defining a medical emergency as a 
“condition which, on the basis of the physician’s good faith clinical judgment, so compli-
cates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion 
of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of sub-
stantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function”).
49. Valery A. Danilack, Anthony Nunes & Maureen Phipps, Unexpected Complications 
of Low-Risk Pregnancies in the United States, 212 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1, 1 
(2015) (finding that of nearly 10.5 million pregnancies observed, twenty-nine percent of 
those consider low-risk faced at least one unexpected complication.).
50. See supra Part I.
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stantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion” 
confer “medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens.”51 Texas im-
plemented statutes that required abortion providers to have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within 30 miles and required the facilities to meet 
standards for ambulatory surgical centers.52 The lower court concluded 
that the admitting privileges requirement reduced the more than forty 
licensed abortion facilities by almost half; the number would have further 
reduced to only seven facilities in the entire state of Texas if the surgical-
center provision had taken effect; the likelihood that the remaining pro-
viders could meet the demand was low; the requirements were particu-
larly burdensome for poor women; and that the risks were not notably
lower at ambulatory surgical centers than at nonsurgical centers.53 In in-
validating the admitting privileges requirement, the Court reasoned that 
the requirement did not bring the health-related benefit it claimed, and 
thus did not outweigh the extraordinary obstacle it imposed.54
Even this more specific test, weighing benefits and burdens, howev-
er, does not address the woman’s life as abortion doctrine requires. In 
June Medical Service v. Russo, all notable mentions of life were in regard to 
the prospective life of the fetus—not the actual life of the mother.55 Po-
tentially, no standard that only aims to reconcile liberty interests with 
state interests will be sufficient to account for the racially disparate state of 
maternal medicine because liberty is not the only constitutional right at 
stake.
III. Abortion as a Right to Life
The disparate outcomes for Black women navigating the institution 
of maternal medicine are catastrophic. Therefore, abortion restrictions 
must account for obscenely high rates of maternal mortality to avoid arbi-
trary deprivations of life—a due process violation. To comply with doc-
trine’s mandate to consider the life and health of the woman, embedded 
in the due process guarantee to not be arbitrarily deprived of life must be 
the right to choose an abortion. State interests must be balanced against 
not only a woman’s liberty interests but the interest in her own life, a 
much more compelling interest requiring much stronger protections. To 
do so, maternal mortality data must be introduced in application of the 
undue burden standard in order to evaluate the nature of the burden—
51. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
52. Id.; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2015); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West 2015).
53. Id. at 2301-02.
54. Id. at 2311. 
55. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (affirming Hellerstedt). 
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liberty or life. Maternal care in the United States is a threat to life. Thus, 
arbitrary abortion restrictions that force women into unwanted pregnan-
cies that put them under maternal care are unconstitutional threats to life.
The Court in Casey acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment “declares that no State shall ‘deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” then 
stated that the controlling word in the cases before the Court was “liber-
ty.”56 As the maternal mortality rate since the 1990’s has more than dou-
bled,57 the Court may not have foreseen that the controlling word in the 
Due Process Clause should have been “life.” As discussed, the language 
of Roe calls for a right to life analysis given the maternal medicine crisis 
that followed the decision: “If the State is interested in protecting fetal 
life . . . it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except 
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”58 In regards to 
maternal mortality, as discussed above, necessity would sometimes only 
be measurable after the woman has already died.59 As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged, women 
“should not have to wait until [they have] been unconstitutionally de-
prived of [their] life or health” before challenging abortion restrictions.60
Equity and justice require courts to accept data that is relevant to evaluat-
ing a state’s legitimate or actualized interest against a woman’s right to 
not be arbitrarily deprived of life.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
specifies that states are banned from depriving any person of life without 
due process of the law.61 This guarantee is largely absent from the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence, assumedly because the application it most 
easily lends to, capital punishment, is adjudicated under the Eighth
Amendment. The Court has also mandated that claims of law enforce-
ment officers using deadly force must be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment, rather than under a due process approach.62 However, the 
Court in Tennessee v. Garner still provided useful guidance to assembling 
an approach that evaluates individual interest in life as it pertains to abor-
56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
57. Delbanco et al., supra note 3.
58. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
59. Danilack, supra note 48, at 1.
60. Women’s Med. Pro. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 196-97 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(establishing the standard of review for facial challenges to abortion statutes).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“Today we make explicit what was 
implicit in Garner’s analysis, and hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have 
used excessive force—deadly or not . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amend-
ment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ ap-
proach.”)(emphasis in original).
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tion restrictions.63 In its dicta, the Garner Court acknowledged that the 
suspect had an interest in his own life. The use of deadly force frustrated 
that interest. But against that interest was the governmental interest in ef-
fective law enforcement.64 Pregnant women have an interest in their own 
lives. Draconian abortion restrictions limiting means necessary to termi-
nate a pregnancy, amongst the highest maternal death rates of any high-
income nation are frustrating that interest. That is what government in-
terest must be weighed against.
Weighing state interest against the woman’s interest in her life and 
health would require two main points of information: impact on abortion 
accessibility (undue burden) and the state’s success with maternal health. 
A state with burdensome abortion restrictions and high maternal mortali-
ty rates increase the chance that one of those women denied an abortion 
will face maternal mortality—and even more so if she is a Black woman.
If those restrictions did not offer significant medical benefit, then that 
death was an arbitrary deprivation of life under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In states with the most abysmal of mortality records, only the most 
compelling, non-arbitrary abortion restrictions will stand under this anal-
ysis. And although the racial disparities in maternal medicine contribute 
to the necessity for focusing on the right to life, that does not preclude 
non-Black women from raising the argument. This is largely because the
maternal mortality rate for all women in the United States is still so high 
that it cannot be ignored in the analysis for statutes that force unwanted 
pregnancies—leading to women’s deaths. The following Parts apply this 
standard to current abortion restrictions in states with varying maternal 
mortality records: Pennsylvania’s informed consent statute, Missouri’s pa-
rental consent statute, and Arizona’s reporting requirements.
A.  Waiting Periods
Pennsylvania’s informed consent statute requires physicians relay 
specific information to a woman seeking an abortion at least twenty-four 
hours prior to the procedure.65 The impact of this statute on abortion ac-
cessibility and the state of Pennsylvania’s maternal health system must be 
weighed against the actualized benefit to the state.
63. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1985); see also Murtishaw v. Woodford, 
255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the petitioner would be deprived “of his life by 
the jury’s potential confusion over the exercise of its statutory discretion,” and thus violat-
ing due process).
64. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. 
65. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990).
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Abortion Accessibility.  The District Court findings in Casey raised 
many of the reasons why waiting periods impinge upon abortion access.66
Due to the “distances many women must travel to reach an abortion 
provider, the practical effect will often be a delay of much more than a 
day because the waiting period requires that a woman seeking an abor-
tion make at least two visits to the doctor.”67 That delay would be felt 
most heavily by low-income women with few resources to support the 
two required trips and any necessary time off of work.68 For some, “mak-
ing the initial trip to an abortion provider is incredibly difficult; making a 
second trip is impossible.”69 In addition to the delay, waiting periods also 
increase women’s exposure to harassment from anti-abortion protestors.70
Beyond the impacts identified by the Court, studies have identified 
that waiting periods in Tennessee have increased the number of second-
trimester abortions by no less than forty-eight percent, which limits the 
types of procedures available, and increases risks and costs.71 Although still 
notably safer than childbirth,72 the risks associated with a second-trimester 
abortion also rise by complicating what would have been a routine pro-
cedure.73 The delay occasioned by waiting periods has added as much as 
$645 to the already costly procedure, and up to a $929 increase when ac-
counting for childcare.74
Maternal Health.  As of May 2019, maternal mortality was continual-
ly increasing in Pennsylvania.75 Like the national rate, Pennsylvania’s ma-
ternal mortality rate is not on par with other high-income countries.76
66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86 (citing 744 F. Supp 1332, 1351 (E.D. Penn. 1990)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 886.
69. Government-Mandated Delays Before Abortion, ACLU https://www.aclu.org/other
/government-mandated-delays-abortion [https://perma.cc/ANT4-U74B] (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2020).
70. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886.
71. Jason M. Lindo & Mayra Pineda-Torres, New Evidence on the Effects of 
Mandatory Waiting Periods for Abortion, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH. 1-2 (Working 
Paper No. 26228, 2019).
72. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced 
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 215
(2012).
73. ACLU, supra note 68.
74. Lindo & Pineda-Torres, supra note 70, at 20.
75. Press Release, Pa. Dep't. of Health, As U.S. Maternal Mortality Rates Rise, De-
partment of Health Stresses Importance of Women’s Health Care (May 13, 2019) 
https://www.media.pa.gov/Pages/Health-Details.aspx?newsid=594 [perma.cc/XV4S-
7X6J].
76. CDC, MATERNAL MORTALITY BY STATE 2 (2018) https://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/maternal-mortality/MMR-2018-State-Data-508.pdf [perma.cc/NKB5-KF3C]; CIA,
supra note 20.
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The state also has a wide racial disparity, as the maternal mortality rate for 
Black women is nearly double that of the general population.77 Pennsyl-
vania is also only one of five states that does not have a statewide Perina-
tal Quality Collaborative (PQC), which would take action to ensure 
healthcare organizations are implementing state recommendations.78 The 
Governor of Pennsylvania signed legislation establishing a Maternal Mor-
tality Review Committee, but because the programs, policies, and rec-
ommendations seem to still be developing,79 it would be premature to 
take that into consideration.
As identified, women have a due process interest in their own lives, 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.80 Because Pennsylvania has 
much improvement to make regarding maternal care, the impact on 
abortion accessibility—extended delays, cost increases, risk increases, ex-
posure to harassment—makes it too likely that the informed consent stat-
ute, as applied, will prevent a woman from receiving an abortion who 
will later die from pregnancy-related complications. The benefit of a re-
quired “period of reflection”81 is insufficient to justify that loss of life.
B.  Parental Consent
A Missouri statute that went into effect in May of 2019 restricts 
abortions for minors unless the physician secures informed written con-
sent from one parent and the consenting parent notified any other custo-
dial parent in writing.82 The impact of this statute on abortion accessibil-
ity and the state of Missouri’s maternal health system must be weighed 
against the State’s concern for the minor’s best interest.
Abortion Accessibility.  Minors largely consult parents before seeking 
abortion care without a legislative mandate to do so.83 The teens that do 
not consult parents, usually have good reason not to—one in five preg-
nant minors have been abused by a parent.84 One-third of teens who do 
77. AMERICA’S HEALTH RANKINGS, HEALTH OF WOMEN & CHILDREN 
https://www.americashealthrankings.org/explore/health-of-women-and-children
/measure/maternal_mortality_a/population/maternal_mortality_a_black/state/PA (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2020).
78. Id.
79. Pa. Dep’t of Health, supra note 74.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
81. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885
(1992).
82. MO. REV. ST. § 188.028 (2019).
83. ADVOC. FOR YOUTH, ABORTION AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS,
https://advocatesforyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Parental-Involvement-
Policy-Brief-2019.pdf [perma.cc/JZS4-QMN8] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020).
84. Id.
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not disclose their pregnancies either experienced violence, feared vio-
lence, or feared they would be forced out of their homes.85 Yet, only fif-
teen of the thirty-seven states that require parent involvement have an 
exception for abuse, assault, incest, or neglect.86 Although parental con-
sent laws must be equipped with judicial bypass mechanisms,87 foreseeable 
issues still exist for minors that do not have access to information on nav-
igating the system or do not have access to the necessary transportation. 
Both compelled parental involvement and judicial bypass provisions 
require a forfeiture of privacy and confidentiality that disincentivizes ado-
lescents from seeking care.88 Teens are already more likely to have later 
abortions—which are more difficult to obtain due to expense and availa-
bility of physicians willing to perform them—and “following enactment 
of Missouri’s parental consent law, the proportion of second-trimester 
abortion among minors increased by 17%.”89 The American Academy of 
Family Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Medical Asso-
ciation, and the Society of Adolescent Medicine all agree that while 
healthcare providers have an obligation to encourage minors to talk to 
their parents regarding reproductive health care, “minors should not be 
forced to involve their parents in their decision to obtain an abortion.”90
Not only is there no evidence that parental involvement laws improve 
family communication or affect outcomes, there is evidence of an in-
creased risk of harm to the adolescent—a risk that judicial bypass provi-
sions do not mitigate.91
Maternal Health.  In Missouri, maternal mortality increased 42.8 % 
from 2016 to 2019.92 Black women in Missouri are more than twice as 
85. GUTTMACHER INST., The Impact of Parental Involvement Laws (Oct. 1, 2008)
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2008/10/impact-parental-involvement-laws#
[perma.cc/7Y3C-7Z9N].
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CONFIDENTIAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR ADOLESCENTS 63 (Madlyn C. Morreale, Amy J. 
Stinnett & Emily C. Dowling eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter POLICY COMPENDIUM]
http://www.cahl.org/PDFs/PolicyCompendium/PolicyCompendium.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KK7-WT2C].
89. ACLU, Laws Restricting Teenagers’ Access to Abortion, https://www.aclu.org
/other/laws-restricting-teenagers-access-abortion [perma.cc/F2G4-X9L3] (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2020).
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likely to die from childbirth than Black women in the United States, 
generally.93 Although Missouri established a maternal mortality review 
committee in 2011, there have still been drastic increases in maternal 
mortality since then.94 After nearly a decade, the Review Board published 
its first report in July 2020. The report includes promising recommenda-
tions—although none race-specific—including standardizing procedures 
across the entire healthcare system, increasing continuity of care, extend-
ing Medicaid coverage to one year postpartum, and more. When these 
recommendations materialize, that data will be relevant in reconciling 
state interests and a woman’s interest in her life. However, until then, the 
only data available to consider is the worsening of an already high mortal-
ity rate.
There is certainly a benefit in furthering the best interests of a child. 
If there was support for the premise that consent laws positively impacted 
minors, this would be worth engaging in a more nuanced analysis of the 
burdens and advantages. Because there is no support,95 any pregnancy-
related deprivation of life of a girl who would have terminated her preg-
nancy if not for the restriction, is arbitrary—and thus a due process viola-
tion. Because there is no evidence that consent laws have a significant 
impact on a minor’s decision to involve parents,96 the Missouri law is not 
promising enough to overcome a girl’s interest in her life. The require-
ment is too loosely related to the minor’s best interest, as Missouri does 
not also require parental involvement in adoption decisions97 or delivery 
care, which is far more dangerous than abortion procedures.98 Missouri’s 
failing maternal care practices and the law’s potential to obstruct abortion 
access make it too likely that any of the girls prevented from receiving an 
abortion will later face maternal death. Thus, the statute is unconstitu-
tional against the backdrop of high and racially disparate maternal mor-
tality rates.
POLICY OPTIONS, (Oct. 2019) https://publichealth.wustl.edu/wp-content/uploads
/2019/10/Maternal-Mortality-in-Missouri-Final-oct-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GLV-
XSR7].
93. Id. (stating that Black women in Missouri die from childbirth at a rate of 91.9 
deaths per 100,000 births).
94. Id.
95. POLICY COMPENDIUM, supra note 87, at 63.
96. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 84; ADVOC. FOR YOUTH, supra note 82; POLICY 
COMPENDIUM, supra note 87, at 63.
97. GUTTMACHER INST., Minor’s Rights as Parents (Last updated Oct. 1, 2020)
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-rights-parents
[https://perma.cc/LYS4-PEWR].
98. ACLU, supra note 68.
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C. Reporting Requirements
Arizona recently expanded its abortion reporting requirements far 
beyond requesting data reasonably related to maternal health.99 In addi-
tion to reasonable demands, such as any maternal health conditions and 
procedural complications, the law mandates an unsettling amount of ad-
ditional information, including: the woman’s educational background, 
marital status, and the number of miscarriages the woman has had; 
whether the abortion was elective, due to maternal or fetal health, or a 
result of rape or incest; the weight of the aborted fetus, statements by the 
physician and all clinic staff that the fetus was not delivered alive, and 
much more.100 The need for this massive amount of information must 
stand up against its impact on abortion accessibility and the state of Ari-
zona’s maternal medicine system.
Abortion Accessibility.  Almost all states require physicians providing 
abortions to submit regular reports.101 It is easy to see how states might 
serve their interests in public health by collecting information on the type 
of abortion procedure used, for example. It is much more difficult to un-
derstand how states would legitimately be furthering their interest in 
public health by collecting information on the weight of the aborted fetus 
and statements by the physician and all present staff that the fetus was not 
delivered alive. Having to prepare that type of statement for every abor-
tion performed burdens providers and increases abortion costs due to the 
additional labor.102 Following enactment of Arizona’s law, one abortion 
provider in the state had to hire additional staff to keep up with the over 
three hours a day devoted to complying with the statute.103 To justify 
demanding information like this, states would need to prepare to defend 
their mandates with the precise ways in which the information is narrow-
ly tailored to achieving a public health goal.
Maternal Health.  The maternal mortality rate in Arizona ranks 
worse than the national rate at 22.3 deaths for every 100,000 births.104 Of 
the 141 maternal deaths reviewed by the Arizona Maternal Mortality 
Review Board over a three-year period, the board considered eighty-
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2161 (2019).
100. Id.
101. GUTTMACHER INST., Abortion Reporting Requirements (Last updated Oct. 1, 2020)
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-rights-parents
[https://perma.cc/58YS-BJ9H].
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nine percent preventable.105 Of note, Arizona is one of nine states to re-
ceive a large, five-year grant from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services,106 and it has an action plan that, at first glance, seems to 
be quite extensive. However, the enumerated performance measures 
mostly consist of non-specific phrases such as, “complete 100% of the ac-
tion items in the recommendation brief,” and the plan is largely silent on 
race.107 Although the report mentions the racial disparity in maternal 
mortality rates that presents for Native American women in Arizona, the 
plan mentions no race-specific methods to remedy that disparity and im-
prove care for indigenous women, other than partnering with Indian 
Health Services.108
Because of the state of maternal health in Arizona, in order to avoid 
arbitrary deprivations of life, the need for the mandated information 
should have to be so crucial that it outweighed an individual right to life. 
Situations in which that would be so are imaginable: if the information 
would assist public health officials in saving a non-negligible amount of 
lives, the risk that a woman denied abortion access would later die from 
pregnancy related concerns may be a risk the Constitution allows. There 
is no evidence that the weight of a fetus is such vital information that it 
will save a number of lives. Thus, the loss of life that could result from 
the statute is arbitrary and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Admittedly, under this analysis, states with identical statutes could 
face different outcomes—that is because the facts differ. Women in Cali-
fornia are not as likely to die from pregnancy related complications and 
childbirth as women in Arkansas,109 thus abortion restrictions in Califor-
nia do not pose the same threat to life as they would in Arkansas. This 
life interest analysis also does not replace the liberty interest analysis—it 
only aids it in a time of abysmal maternal care in the United States.
105. See CITADEL CABASAG, VIVIENNE RUBIO & DALLAS WILLIAMS, ARIZ. DEP’T OF 
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mortality-review-2012-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM3D-BBKK]; see also Jeff Rosen-
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in Casey, Hellerstedt, and June Medical Services,
purported to rely heavily on factual record.110 The facts here are that 
pregnancy and childbirth is claiming lives, especially Black lives, at a stag-
geringly high rate. While this is so, abortion restrictions cannot remain 
unmoved by this racially disparate state of maternal medicine. A standard
that aims to assess the constitutionality of an abortion restriction can no 
longer only balance state interests against liberty interests—it must also 
balance state interests against a woman’s interest in preserving her own 
life.
Abortion advocates must incorporate maternal mortality data into 
the factual record for courts to consider whether states are affording 
women the opportunity to choose life; courts must accept that data as 
relevant to consideration of life that started with Roe. “Kira deserved bet-
ter . . . . Women all over the country deserve better.”111 Although the 
priority should be addressing the racial disparity in maternal mortality, 
demanding the proper constitutional protections is one way we can start 
to do better in the meantime—one way we can begin rebalancing the 
scales of reproductive justice.
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